CUDES JOURNAL CURRENT DEBATES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

Zriba, H. (2019). The idea of belonging /integrating: the exclusive inclusion. *Journal of Current Debates in Social Sciences*, 2(1), 24-41.

Research Article

The idea of belonging/integrating: *the exclusive inclusion*

Dr. Hassen ZRIBA
University of Gafsa, Tunisia
hassen_zriba@yahoo.fr
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7968-0229

Article Info

Received: *06.05.2019*
Accepted: *15.05.2019*

Keywords: Belonging, Integration, Multiculturalism, Assimilationism, Pluralism.

Abstract

In this article, I embark on a critical appraisal of the various theories of integration and belonging in their relation to ethnic minorities and especially Muslim ones in Britain. Different perspectives produced different accounts of how to deal with ethnic and religious minorities in liberal societies like that of Britain. However, I want to suggest that each policy or ideology of integration is inevitably the product of its specific historical and cultural contexts. They are dominant because of the subjective and objective parameters that allowed their production. Yet, as soon as they are formed, they hold the center of the intellectual, cultural and political discourses. They became the well-established wisdom of the day. Accordingly, assimilation was the norm of the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s Britain as was multiculturalism the jargon of the late 1980s and 1990s. Hence, I expose the various theoretical and political accounts of the different strategies of integrating British ethnic and religious minorities.

1. INTRODUCTION

The issue of Muslim integration into the mainstream British society has been tricky and challenging. Challenging as it has been, both the Muslim and British mainstream communities pondered on the best ways to set up bridges of communication and intercultural contacts. Arguably, Muslim communities seem to face a double concentrated pattern of racism because of their being both ethnically and religiously different from the "normal" or rather "normalized" versions of British identity. Muslims' integration in the British society came to the fore as an urgent theoretical, social, cultural and political concern. A major striking question has been: are they British Muslims or Muslims in Britain. Different political and social theorists attempted to decipher the various experiences of integrating British ethnic minorities in general and the Muslim ones in particular. An array of discourses are developed, and political procedures are suggested to remedy what is generally perceived as deficiencies and anomalies in the integration and belonging of Muslim communities within British societies. Different perspectives produced different accounts and theories of how to deal with ethnic and religious minorities in liberal societies like that of Britain. What follows is the discussion of those concerned theories and the political and socio-cultural premises upon which they were built.

The British political theorist Bhikhu Parekh (1998) offered different models or modes for integrating ethnic and cultural minorities within mainstream British society. The guiding question has been how to achieve stability and legitimacy within a given political system by rebuilding communal bonds of civility and tolerance across the conflicts and divisions caused by the plurality of cultural values and individual interests.

Scrutinized from a normative perspective, Parekh identified five possible approaches that any multiethnic community can employ to come to terms with the cultural and social difference. Those models are Proceduralist Model, Assimilationist Model, Bifurcationist Model, Pluralist Model, and the Millet Model. Those different models echo different normative accounts and analyses of how political theorists and theories viewed the possible means of integrating and accommodating difference notably

ethnic and cultural difference. Obviously, there have been other theoretical considerations of the various ways of accommodating and integrating ethnic minorities within their respective host societies. For example, Stephen Castles, in his influential article "How nation-states respond to immigration and ethnic diversity" (1995) identified three possible strategies that outlined the paradigms of integrating ethnic minorities in the host receiving societies. Those three types of state policy towards immigrants are differential exclusion, assimilation, and pluralism. Those three models differ considerably from one society to another and even in the same society, they differ from one era to another. Yet, in this article, I opted for the more sophisticated and comprehensive account of the political theorist Bhikhu Parekh. This does not mean that Parekh's analysis holds the absolute truth about the politics of integration and their socio-cultural political mechanism. I refer to other narratives and accounts through this article. Yet, Bhikhu Parekh's models, I believe, sprang from his close experiences of the British context being he himself a member of an ethnic minority.

2. THE PROCEDURALIST MODEL

The Proceduralist Model is the deliberative model of democratic practice since it emphasizes certain institutional procedures and practices for attaining decisions on an issue so fundamental and constitutive of democratic political creed. Briefly, in this model, the state is supposed to be neutral and formal and even "a-cultural". By "a-culturalism", I mean that it should adopt and endorse no specific cultural identity or repertoire; otherwise, it will be regarded as favoring some cultural groups at the expense of others. Thus, the state follows the formal procedures of enacting and executing laws. In this context, citizens, regardless of their ethnic, cultural or political traits are expected to respect the law and obey the legal frameworks of the state. As far as ethnic minorities are concerned, the state respects their cultural and social choices and strategies in an absolute way. Bhikhu Parekh explains that the ultimate goal of a proceduralist state is to prevail law, preserve political unity and champion social cohesion. Concerning, the minorities (ethnic or whatsoever), Parekh writes "are free to embrace the majority way of life, or to lead totally isolated and self-contained lives provided that they discharge their basic legal obligations to the state" (1998: pp 1-2). The Proceduralist Model, thus, allows different articulations of conflicting and different interests within a political framework of political cooperation and engagement. The state is an intermediary of conflicts and settles them within the collectively accepted rules of the game.

Within the Habermasian model of reflexive epistemic proceduralism, democratic tradition is a process of deliberative acts between the various political agents who act equally and without any discernible pressure. This deliberative democracy is ideal in that it does not support elitist concerns and it tries to include all concerned interests in public deliberation. Pérez Zafrilla in Soledad Analía Pérez (2017) states the anticipated benefits from a proceduralist deliberative democracy. Zafrilla argues that deliberative democracy has a number of values

> *a) Deliberation increases available knowledge and reduces cognitive asymmetries since it favours information exchange on interests and needs of those concerned by the decisions.*
>
> *b) It permits the expression of individuals' preferences, interests, and needs, which allows them to reinterpret different stances after listening, understanding and interpreting the views of others.*
>
> *c) It allows detecting and acknowledging mistakes.*
>
> *d) Screening acceptable reasons will allow individuals to face their own prejudices and value the opinions of others.*
>
> *e) Manipulation of information becomes more difficult since it enables its distribution, circulation, and interpretation by a large number of agents.*
>
> *f) The inclusion of diverse perspectives implies a greater possibility of avoiding cognitive mistakes and biases typical of homogeneous situations* (2017: 453).

Epistemic Proceduralism is seen as perfect for deliberative debates within a form of democracy that gives priority to open collective debates of active and participatory citizens away from the mechanisms of negotiation, demagogy, and manipulation.

Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. Thompson in their book *Why Deliberative Democracy?* (2002) discuss the idea that citizens owe each other mutually acceptable and practical reasons for the laws they enact. This would promote a culture of deliberation built of politics of consensus in decision making. Gutmann and Thompson define deliberative proceduralist democracy as "'"a form of government in which free and equal citizens and their representatives justify decisions in a process in which they give other reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching decisions that are binding on all at present but open to challenge in the future" (2002: pp 3-7). This definition identifies at least four fundamental aspects of relations between the citizens of the polity in question. The first aspect is mutuality or reciprocity which permits an acceptable degree of cooperation between the various political and social agents freely and equally. The second feature is accessibility allowing public and easily understandable reasons for virtually every citizen that would facilitate communication and then active participation. The third aspect is "bindingness"; deliberative debates virtually lead to decisions in the form of binding laws that every participant has to respect and bind himself/herself by them. The last characteristic is dynamism or better provisionalism that entails the possibility of altering the law in the future when no longer responsive to the conditions of its initial existence.

Access and participation in the public sphere are paramount to this model of democratization. Access is thus open and unlimited. Citizens have to be able to understand to be active, informed participants in deliberative democracy. They have to learn how to deliberate in a context of a mutually cooperative milieu of communication and collaboration. Amartya Sen emphasizes the informative and communicative nature of epistemic deliberative democracy. Sen writes that

> *Our conception of needs relates to our ideas of the preventable nature of some deprivations and to our understanding of what can be done about them. In the formation of understandings and beliefs about feasibility (particularly, social feasibility), public discussions play a crucial role. Political rights, including freedom of expression and discussion, are not only pivotal in inducing social responses to economic needs; they are also central to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves* (1999: 11).

The issues of feasibility and compatibility of public discussion with the expectations of the political agents are essential to the well-performance and success of the Proceduralist Model of deliberative democracy. Effective participation is integral to the strength and durability of the model. The Proceduralist Model is, therefore, a participatory form of integrating minorities in the mainstream polity with no conditional appeals of clinging to a certain preferred or majority-oriented cultural system. It stands as an emblem of impartiality, knowledge, and rationality.

However, the Proceduralist Model of integrating minorities' seems to suffer from a number of shortcomings. It is basically utopian since it is not clear how democratic and deliberative procedures will be put into effect. It seems more normative and speculative than descriptive and practical. Moreover, the Proceduralist Model seems to indulge in a fiction or myth of impartiality and neutrality. In its claiming of neutrality, the model generates a static homogenous fictional representation of how it proceeds politically, socially and culturally. Back to Bhikhu Parekh, the Proceduralist Model is misleading and evasive. Parekh argues that the model is "logically incoherent, for no political community can be culturally neutral and be based on procedural foundations alone. Every cultural community has two basic features: it has a specific structure of authority, and it makes and enforces collectively binding laws. *Neither of these can be morally neutral*" (1998: pp5-6, italics are mine).

The political structure upon which the model is based has its own cultural background. It may be well covered or hidden, but this does not mean that it does not exist. It works underway and underlines almost every deliberative procedure. The nature of the state, its extent of intervention and its strategies of political organization are pure choices from a wide array of possibilities. Equally, legislation and law-making are processes of choices and moral orientations. Citizens who abide with them share their cultural and ideological tendencies; those who do not will necessarily find themselves marginalized and outlawed. Thus, according to Parekh "since every law coerces those not sharing its underlying values, a morally non-coercive state is a fantasy" (1998: 6). Evidently, even the liberal values of liberty, freedom of speech, the supremacy of law and peaceful change may outrage those cultures that may have their particular views and ideologies that contradict with some of those liberal values. The state is by definition a coercive institution and can neither be neutral nor impartial. The Proceduralist Model is more prescriptive and normative approach than descriptive and empirical. In my view, this model of

integration cannot represent the real picture of ethnic minorities in contemporary Britain fully. It seems over-simplistic in its approach of the complex cultural and political relations within a multi-ethnic and multicultural society like Britain. Arguably, the Proceduralist Model can be read as a version of social engineering that underestimates the dynamic interactions and cultural traits of the British socio-cultural landscape. I affirm the inability of the model to sufficiently delineate the true picture of multicultural Britain. Nevertheless, Proceduralist Model can be effective if it works in coordination and complementarity with other more comprehensive and well-informed models of integration. The second model to be examined is the Assimilationist Model.

3. THE ASSIMILATIONIST/ MONOCULTURAL MODEL

The Assimilationist Model of ethnic minorities' integration is a well-established model. It stems its ideological and discursive legitimacy from the claim that any social community has a distinctive cultural identity that is based on specific world views and epistemological conceptions of the good and the evil. These conceptions are not universal; they are context-governed cultural constructions. Another major claim of the Assimilationist Model is that such cultural community needs considerable degrees of internal social coherence and cohesion. To preserve and create such cohesion cultural myths of sameness and common origins are being continuously created and maintained. Any "alien" cultural system is likely to disturb and even eradicate the well-established cultural identity. The Assimilationist Model is perfectly captured by the ideology of nationalism. Nationalism believes in the purity and tangible existence of the "Nation" with its well-defined territory, population, and political state. Assimilationist Model and nationalism seems to be two faces of the same coin since they flourish on almost the same set of cultural, political and ideological assumptions. The idea of similarity of world views and cultural experiences is constitutive of nationalist assimilatory ideology. The British New Right politician John Casey expressed such powerful dimension of nation-based assimilation. He argued that British identity and history are defined in cultural terms and hence:

> *There is no way of understanding British and English history that does not take seriously the sentiments of patriotism that go with the continuity of institutions, shared experiences, language, customs, and kinship… English patriotism has at its center a feeling for persons of one's kind"* (Quoted in Seidel, 1986: 112).

Those discourses of patriotism and cultural imaginings of national identity are fundamentally exclusionary of ethnic minorities and their alternative cultural constructions. There seems to be "no black in the Union Jack". Nationhood and nationalism are constructed as powerful prerequisites for the assimilation and vice versa. The American historian Benedict Anderson deciphered the various mechanisms that lead to the creation and maintenance of the concept of the nation upon which nationalism and assimilationism are founded. His concept of "imagined communities" proved very influential in uncovering the meaning and nature of the community, the nation and virtually any human associative entity. Nations, as Bhabha confirmed in his *Nation and Narration* (1990), are acts of legitimizing specific narratives. Bhabha writes that

> *Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realize their horizons in the mind's eye. Such an image of the nation — or narration — might seem impossibly romantic and excessively metaphorical, but it is from those traditions of political thought and literary language that the nation emerges as a powerful historical idea in the west.* (1990: 1)

Accordingly, nations are legitimate only in the eyes of those who created them and narrated their very existence. Despite the ambivalent and indeterminate nature of the concept, it proved powerful in the modernist project of the nation-state. Yet, what looms large is the cultural power that has been associated with the concept of nation. I believe that a nation is more a cultural construct than a political one. Its essence is cultural sameness that is required to activate it as a political and ideological apparatus. I uncover the understanding of the concept of the nation by one influential social theorist Benedict Anderson in more detail.

For Anderson, the nation is just an imagined and invented community. It has no correlation with some historical or material entities. Nations are images in the minds of those who believe in them. The nation is continually connected with and discursively related to a fabricated consciousness about the territorial and administrative apparatuses. Anderson argued that the nation "is an imagined political

community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1991: 6). Thus the imagined nation is characterized by a number of features. Andersons believes that the concept of nation is imagined, limited, sovereign, and community-based. The imagined-ness of the concept of nation is justified by the fact that not all members of such national space will know each other personally whatever was the size of the community. However, each one of them is able to construct idealized shared images of what their nation is and what it is about. The nation is imagined and invented as limited space. Limited-ness derives the elastic nature of this political-cultural entity. Nations are boundary setters. The exclude while they include. The idea of belonging is limited to a group of people who share the same imagination. Thus, the concept of nation and the ideology of nationalism are exclusionary in their nature and in their functional mechanisms as well. Third, sovereignty is justified by the historical context of the creation of the concept of nation. Anderson writes that "the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm" (1991:7). The nation was formulated in adversarial frameworks vis-à-via the established institutions of absolute monarchies and hegemonic churches. The issue of sovereignty was paramount to sustain the idea of the nation. The last aspect of the concept of the nation is being a community. The nation is seen or rather constructed as a community since it represents a "deep, horizontal comradeship" (7) that seems to transcend the diversity of conflicts and fragmentations, inequalities and exploitations that prevail in any social group. Importantly, the concept of the nation goes beyond the lived social and individual experiences, with all their diversities, multiplicities and multi-vocalities. It creates a homogenous self-contained community that thrives on imagined and constructed images, histories and mythologies. Those imaginings are centrally cultural. Equally, they create physical and metaphysical boundaries that both include and exclude. Nations are based on cultural identities, generally conceived as original, pure and uncontaminated. This intellectual paradigm will undoubtedly consider immigrants and ethnic minorities as aliens who are very likely to disturb the purity and stability of the nation. Seen from this prism, ethnic minorities are constructed and imagined as a threat to the idea of the nation and the ideology of nationalism. Accordingly, within the assimilationist/nationalist model, ethnic minorities are required to dive into the host cultural experiences and adapt them in order to be fully accepted as legal members of this "imagined community".

The politics of assimilation can take numerous forms and adopt different strategies. Targeted ethnic minorities can be asked to opt for different patterns of behavior and hold specific cultural and social values to be included in the fabric of the mainstream community.

Bhikhu Parekh suggested two possible pressures that immigrants and ethnic minorities may face within the Assimilationist Model. Those two "options" represent, perhaps, two degrees of assimilation within the assimilatory continuum. They can equally be read as two versions within the same political paradigm. The first version demands that ethnic minorities have to adopt the totality of the host society's cultural traditions and ways of life so that they could assimilate successfully within the mainstream community. Thus, they will not be anomalous in the fabric of the cultural paradigm. The second version seems to be more exigent. It asks for more than adapting to and adoption of the dominant cultural tradition. It wants ethnic minorities to love their country of residence even more than that of origin and to be absolutely loyal to it. Otherwise, ethnic minorities have to leave the country of residence; a case of "love it or leave it" racist discourses. Unconditional loyalty and identification are a prerequisite for enjoying the rights of citizenship and belonging. Parekh affirms that this version of assimilation "claims the soul of the minorities and seeks their total identification, goes far beyond the ordinary forms of cultural and even biological assimilation and is best called nationalist assimilation" (1998: 2). I suggest calling it even patriotic or jingoistic assimilationism given its extremist demands and pressures that it imposes on ethnic minorities and immigrant communities. I would like here to examine two historical exemplary case studies of this national assimilationism and the impact produced on British ethnic minorities. The first is the notorious case of the Conservative leader Enoch Powell's "Rivers of Blood Speech" of 1968. The second is that of the Conservative politician Norman Tebbit's Cricket Test of 1990.

Enoch Powell's "Rivers of Blood Speech" was a powerful political speech, generally described as racist. It was delivered by the Conservative politician Enoch Powell in April 1968. The Powellian thesis was based on the assimilatory British nationalism. He, just like all British nationalists, believed that the newcomers, ethnic minorities and the aliens represented a clear and present danger to the cohesion and purity of British national identity. Powell opposed the liberal politics of the then consensus.

Thus, non-white immigration if unbridled would generate "alien" "rivers of blood". According to Powellian discourses, Black immigration must be opposed since it constituted a serious threat to the British way of life and British identity. He argued that

> *Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad. We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre*. (Blaisdell, 2011:165)

Powell was so conscious about the increasing number of immigrants and their offspring and the impact they were ensuing on Britain and Britishness. However, importantly, Enoch Powell was not the exception. According to Shamit Saggar, he simply voiced and articulated anti-immigrants sentiments that were gathering momentum. Saggar wrote in his book *Race and Politics in Britain* (1992) that

> *The black immigrants were generally unpopular and an electoral liability was not in dispute prior to Powell's interjection into the debate; the dispute that did arise following his remarks centered on whether such explicit anti-black sentiment could be tolerated at the heart of the government. Powell therefore merely played on the latent hostility to black people that already existed, only adding his own touch to the grim warning repeated so often both before and since* (1992: 175)

It was clear that Powell's thesis was a mere reflection of the anti-immigrants structure of feelings that dominated postwar Britain. Powell, like large sections of the British white population, thought that the British identity and British nation can only be preserved and defined meaningfully in ethnic and cultural discursive formations. They imagined Britain as a cultural community with limited and well-defined space, and with cultural sovereignty. Significantly, one decade later the Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher employed the same anti-immigrant discourses and played the same race-related card in her 1979 General Election campaign. She warned that "If we went on as we are then, by the end of the century, there would be four million people of the new Commonwealth or Pakistan here. Now, that is an awful lot and I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture" (Thatcher in Jeffries, 2014). It seems that the assimilationist model is so entrenched in the British political and popular behavior.

I come now to another striking example of national assimilation within British political and cultural discourses: Norman Tebbit's Cricket Test of 1990. The Cricket Test was introduced by Lord Norman Tebbit to measure and check the loyalty of an ethnic minority to Britain. It argued that the immigrants and the settled British ethnic minorities who support their native countries of origin rather than England at the sport of cricket do not considerably integrate into the mainstream British society. The targeted minorities are notably those of South Asian origins. In an interview with the *Los Angeles Times*, Norman Tebbit declared that "A large proportion of Britain's Asian population fail to pass the cricket test. Which side do they cheer for? It's an interesting test. Are you still harking back to where you came from or where you are?" (Carvel, 2004).

Again, British ethnic minorities are represented as a potential threat to national identity and social cohesion. Tebbit's Cricket Test, I believe, projects them as a fifth column tactically and strategically ready to betray Britain and undermine its homogenous pure culture. Ethnic minorities are then thwarting the stability of British mainstream society. This type of discourse is based, as mentioned above, on narrow exclusionary constructions of national identity. Postwar ethnic and immigrant minorities' cultural differences have always been regarded as a transient; an immediate effect of their contact with the British host community. Thus, it was believed that those newcomers would assimilate into the host culture gradually and progressively. The dominant model of integrating those minorities was generally referred to as the Immigration-Integration Model that was built upon a number of ideological and political assumptions. John Richardson and John Lambert in their influential book *The Sociology of Race* (1985) outlined those underlying assumptions. They suggested that the assimilationist politics rested on the premises that:

1- *The Immigrants are strangers by virtue of their color and culture.*
2- *The host society is confused and insecure and, as a result, reacts with both hostility and tolerance.*
3- *The host society is stable and does not have any fundamental conflicts within it.*

4- *This stability is temporarily disturbed by immigrants. Order is restored, however, when the immigrants adapt to British society and the white population accepts immigrants.*
5- *This process of adaptation and acceptance may be broken into several phases which can proceed at varying speeds and may be complete only after several generations have passed.* (Abercrombie *et al*, 1994: 248).

Arguably, the Immigration-Integration Model seems to incarnate a number of ideological and racial assumptions. It suggested that immigrants belonged to a different "race" since they have a different color and culture. The focus on "color" invokes the biological constructions of difference and entrenches the concept of race and by analogy the ideology of racism, as constitutive of human classification and categorization. This would generate a hierarchical ordering of people into superior and inferior "races". Moreover, the discursive formations of this model appear self-contradictory. It postulates that the host British society is stable and has no basic internal conflicts, which is not the truth. British society just like any other advanced industrial society has its internal conflicts. Class issues, gender differences, and national antagonisms among others disturb the alleged stability of British society constantly. Immigrants and ethnic minorities are not the only sources of confusion and instability. As suggested above, the very concept of nationhood is hard to keep coherent and stable. It is imagined and always re-imagined. The Immigration-Integration Model constructs difference as a problem and assimilation as the solution to guarantee the social cohesion and homogeneity of British society and culture.

Abercrombie *et al*, (1994) suggest that the Immigration-Integration Model, and the assimilationist agenda that underpinned it, are misleading since the aim was not integrating or assimilating immigrants. Historically, the increasing number of immigration control acts reflected the hegemonic tendency of the various post-war British governments to curb the number of immigrants and keep it as low as possible. Moreover, the focus on the racism and discriminatory practices against British ethnic minorities relegated the widespread xenophobic attitudes of the majority of the mainstream population to an invisible position. Equally, inter-ethnic cultural diversities were winked at and underestimated. This model, I believe, conceived the immigrants and ethnic minorities as a Tabula Rasa that can be shaped according to the wishes of the British population and authorities.

Appraised from many angels, the Assimilationist Model, powerful as it was, has been suffering from a number of theoretical and practical lacunas. Bhikhu Parekh stated three major ones. Assimilationism is theoretically and empirically incoherent as a doctrine. The concept of nation or national culture in which minorities are required to assimilate is not clearly defined. It is a multidimensional and multi-faceted concept. As stated before, the nation is an imagined community that, in many respects, has not real correlates. The national identity or national culture is at best partial subjective socio-cultural constructions. National identity is considerably a homogenized and distorted concoction; an "ideologue's misguided account of it" (Parekh, 1998: 7). The second, gap is that assimilation is not practical. It turns out to be a version of social and cultural engineering that hampers genuine integration more than seconding it. Assimilation is built on the politics of intolerance and preclusion of difference and the different. Thus, it seems that people of various ethnic minorities, if left free to negotiate their differences, would set up accommodated social and cultural relations. Those spontaneous, uncontrolled relations are likely to push cultural dialogue and integration forward. Moreover, assimilation, despite some potential for success, at least a short-term one, cannot be taken as a viable and acceptable option with a liberal society like Britain. It stands against the very values of liberalism, individualism, and equality. Liberal democratic systems are required to accept and accommodate differences within the framework of freedom of speech and mutual respect. Obviously, the Assimilationist Model cannot be liberal, at least as a lived experience. Commenting on the dogma of national identity and cultural nationalism, Ernest Renan warns us that

> *Such exaggerations enclose one within a specific culture, considered as national; one limits oneself, one hems oneself in. One leaves the heady air that one breathes in the vast field of humanity in order to enclose oneself in a conventicler with one's compatriots. Nothing could be worse for the mind; nothing could be more disturbing for civilization.* (Renan in Bahbaha, 1990: p17)

In another passage, Renan advises

Let us not abandon the fundamental principle that man is a reasonable and moral being, before he is cooped up in such and such a language, before he is a member of such and such a race, before he belongs to such and such a culture. Before French, German or Italian culture there is human culture. (Renan in Bahbaha, 1990: p17)

4. THE BIFURCATIONIST/ INTEGRATIONIST MODEL

The third model suggested by Parekh is called the "Bifurcationist Model". In fact, this coinage was suggested by Parekh himself capture the integrative practice that holds a half-way position between the two extremes proceduralism and assimilationism. It is sort of half or partial assimilation. This model can also be named "Integrationist Model". It asks for assimilation in the public sphere and particularism in the private one. The distinction between the public sphere and the private one is necessary to the success of this model. There should be a sense of national, political and cultural common identity which all the citizens, minorities or majorities, respect, and share. The integration-oriented agenda of the Bifurcationist Model is based on the coexistence of the binary values of diversity and unity within the same social community. Integration suggests the creation and maintenance of boundaries between the political public sphere and the personal private one. The Bifurcationist Model is defined in terms of equality. Citizens whether they belonged to the mainstream majority or the subordinate minorities have to be equal in the public political culture; equal before the law and enjoy their rights and duties equally. Yet, they are free to pursue the particularities of their cultures at a private and personal dimension. Appraised from a positive angle, integration is perhaps best deemed as reciprocal consensus and compromise, a process that requires mutual respect from all included citizens. So the principles of justice and equality make up the core of the Bifurcationist Model at least in its public political version. Though this should not be taken at its face value, as we will see in the criticism of this model, it remains one preferred model in integrating ethnic minorities in many multi-ethnic communities. Leif Wenar analyzed the John Rawls' major principles of the political conception of the theory of justice. Winner expounded that almost all liberal political, cultural communities agreed on one version or another of the political conception of the ideal of justice. Those major points could be summarized as follows:

1-A liberal political conception of justice will ascribe to all citizens familiar with individual rights and liberties, such as rights of free expression, liberty of conscience, and free choice of occupation;

2-A political conception will give special priority to these rights and liberties, especially over demands to further the general good (e.g., to increase national wealth) or perfectionist values (e.g., to promote a particular view of human flourishing);

3-A political conception will assure for all citizens sufficient all-purpose means to make effective use of their freedoms. (Wenar, 2017)

As shown, the principle of equality and that of justice are constitutive and fundamental in liberal theory. All citizens, whatever was their cultural belonging, need to enjoy their full potential in a liberal society given that they abide with the political culture of the state apparatus in that community. The Bifurcationist Model sought a strong public political culture that is able to keep the social and political cohesion of the general community, despite the local and private multiethnic and multicultural character of immigrant and national minorities. The model seems, I believe, to take some premises of the politics of assimilation in its public version and those of pluralism in its private one.

Nevertheless, the Bifurcationist Model is likely to homogenize the public political culture and places it above criticism and negotiation. Ethnic minorities are given ample room to indulge their cultural differences and particularities at a local and private level, yet no public recognition is allocated to them. This seems to stifle their socio-cultural development. The politics of recognition are crucial for any community to develop its latent cultural and social potentials. The social and political theorist Charles Taylor elaborated what can be termed "a politics of recognition model" in which he emphasized the centrality of public recognition in the socio-cultural and psychological construction of any community whatever it was its nature or orientation. He affirmed that recognition "is one of the driving forces behind nationalist movements in politics. And the demand comes to the fore in a number of ways in today's politics, on behalf of minority or "subaltern" groups, in some forms of feminism and in what is today called the politics of "multiculturalism" (Gutmann, 1994: 25). Charles Taylor says that individual and social identities are partly shaped by recognition or its absence. Consequently,

misrecognition or more often un-recognition of others leads a person or a group of people to suffer real damage, real distortion. Public dominant agents around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning public image of their "deviant" culture.

The specific importance of recognition is to be crucially noticed in its relationship to identity, which Taylor defines as 'a person's understanding of who they are, of their fundamental characteristics as a human being' (Taylor, 1994: 25). Since identity (individual or social) is 'partly shaped by recognition or its absence', then 'Non-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being' (ibid.). Within the same vein of thought, Paddy McQueen suggests that social and cultural recognition or non-recognition is constitutive of individual and social identities. Thus, people are, to a considerable extent, what the others think about them. McQueen argues that

> *The importance of recognition lies precisely in the fact that how others see (might) us is a necessary step in forming an understanding of who we are. To be recognized negatively, or misrecognised, is to be thwarted in our desire for authenticity and self-esteem.* (Paddy McQueen)

This cultural and political organization would leave ethnic minorities unable to identify with the public established culture and hence unable to support or contribute to it. After all, the cultural potentials of human beings are one basic source of their self-esteem and self-assertion. Structurally, this hegemonic publish culture would trigger ethnic disadvantages. Privilege is always allocated to the public realm while the private is relegated to a secondary position. This means ethnic minorities with their multicultural trends will be cast aside and be fossilized on the margin of the mainstream. They will constitute the periphery while the public realm will be the center. Hence, the balance and distribution of power are deficient. The subordination of the private sphere is institutionalized. The public culture will have an exclusive monopoly of the material and symbolic sources of power in society. Ethnic minorities will be confined to their private world and their cultures will be gradually devalued. Parekh affirms this binary distinction between the dominant public culture and subordinate private cultures would result into "the excluded cultures come to be seen as marginal, peripheral, even deviant and inferior, only worth practicing outside the public gaze of society and in the privacy of the family and communal associations. Since the public realm prizes uniformity, diversity gets devalued thought society" (1998: 9). Such uneven distribution and hierarchy of cultural practices would promote a double space for ethnic minorities between which they constantly vacillate. They can even develop a schizophrenic ethnic character or find themselves assimilating into the dominant public culture to guarantee the benefits of such assimilation. Bhiku Parekh was an eye witness on the impact of such binary division on ethnic minorities, notably on the interethnic generation gap. Parekh writes

> *A couple of years ago when I was travelling by train from London to Hull, I was sitting opposite an elderly Pakistani couple and next to their adolescent daughter. When the crowded train pulled out of King's Cross station, the parents began to talk in Urdu. The girl felt restless and nervous and began making strange signals to them. As they carried on their conversation for a few more minutes, she angrily leaned over the table and asked them to shut up. When the confused mother asked for an explanation, the girl shot back: 'just as you do not expose your private parts in public, you do not speak in that language in public'* (9, italic in the original)

This lengthy quotation clearly manifests the negative and even the destructive impact of the public/private division on ethnic minorities and their offspring. The violent reaction of the girl is, in fact, a protest against the socio-cultural and political engineering of the Bifurcationist Model and its strategies of integration. The public monoculturalism of this model will inevitably impact on the private multiculturalism and destroys it if no special accommodations and revisions are introduced by the state as a corrective of thus unbalanced relation. Now, I move to the fourth model of integration that is the Pluralist Model which regarded as the most hegemonic model in contemporary Britain.

5. THE PLURALIST/ MULTICULTURAL MODEL

The pluralist model is based on the political tradition that power and access to resources are fragmented throughout society. There is no stable center of power and authority in the pluralistic community. Power and influence are dispersed and socio-cultural and political balance is being

continually negotiated between the various pressure groups in such a pluralistic community. Pluralism offers a set of politics that allows immigrants and ethnic minorities to enjoy equal status within the pluralist society both in the public and private spheres. It champions the discourses and politics of recognition as Charles Taylor understands them. Thus the Pluralist Model encourages the politics of multiculturalism and values both the ideals of unity and diversity. Importantly, this model marks a transition from the politics of tolerance to the politics of recognition. Such a move is a crucial one since it recognizes ethnic and cultural differences as integral and constitutive of the British mainstream culture.

In this section, I take pluralism to mean multiculturalism. I am aware that there are important differences between the two concepts, especially when seen from a normative political perspective. Yet, I stress the multiple nature of the concept of pluralism which is, in many respects, compatible with cultural diversity and multiculturalism. Here, I want to suggest that even the two concepts of cultural diversity and multiculturalism can, in different contexts, mean different things. Multiculturalism is used often to describe cultural diversity and plurality in any society. However, there are even prescriptive tendencies of the concept (see Favell, 2001 and Kymlicka 1995).

The Pluralist Model is in striking contrast with the Assimilationist Model. While the Pluralist Model celebrates cultural pluralism and diversity, the Assimilationist Model works to establish cultural sameness and conformity. To use popular American metaphors, pluralism is about "Salad Bowl" whereas assimilationism is the champion of "Melting Pot".

In Britain, there is a general tendency to refer to the 1980s and 1990s as the decades when multicultural politics and multiculturalism witnessed their heydays. Yet, historically speaking, the stories of cultural diversity, inter-culturalism and multiculturalism go back to the days of the British Empire and its cultural, political and economic contacts with other nations. It seems that British society has a long tradition in intercultural experiences.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the British race-related approach was rather pluralist. Accordingly, the British authorities thought that ethnic minorities needed more than mere tolerance (which was given priority by the Bifurcationist Model). The suggested alternative was more recognition of ethnic cultural values. This recognition was to pervade both the private and public spheres of British society. Thus multiculturalism was systematically encouraged and institutionalized. The theoretical trends within social and cultural theory signaled the salience and the emergence of what came to be called the "cultural turn" within race-related issues. The culture was recognized as vital in human societies. Culture is not crucial just for the group, but also for the individuals. So, to put it clearly, humans are understood as basically cultural beings whose cultures are constitutive of their individual behaviors and decisive in their socioeconomic and political pursuits. It has become the wisdom of the day that ethnic minorities needed cultural recognition and valuation to feel and live their very potentials as full human beings.

The Pluralist Approach to integrating minorities was hospitable to cultural diversity and cultural pluralism. Cultural pluralists believe that ethnic minorities should be given the opportunity to enjoy their cultural rights along with others. This enjoyment has to be both in personal/private sphere and public/political one. There should a recognition and positive accommodation of their different cultural practices and religious values. Leading theorists in political science such as Will Kymlicka believed that such minority rights can be accommodated and activated in what he called "group-differentiated rights" (1995). Will Kymlicka was a pioneer in developing, I believe, the most comprehensive and influential liberal theory of multiculturalism and minority group rights. He combined the conventional liberal values of autonomy and equality to values of cultural membership and belonging. His major aim was to accommodate minority rights within the liberal theory. It is crucial to explain that Kymlicka meant by his theory to include both cultural and national minorities. After all, Will Kymlicka is a Canadian political scientist who was engaged primarily with Canadian issues of indigenous populations, immigrant communities and issues of national and linguistic identity related to the bi-lingual nature of Canada (coexistence of Anglophone and Francophone communities. However, despite these Canadian cultural specificities, his model is applicable, with different degrees, to other liberal democratic societies like Britain. In his two influential books Libralism, Community and Culture (1989) and *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (1995), Will Kymlicka developed a comprehensive liberal pluralist theory that evinced how culture and cultural membership are crucial to not only members

of cultural and national minorities but to the mainstream community as well. For Kymlicka, cultures are instrumentally important to individuals since cultural membership is vital to the autonomy and independence of the individual. Cultures are considered as "contexts of choice" (Kymlicka, 1995: 89) from which the individual can exercise his/her right of freedom of choice and hence his/her autonomy is practical and meaningful. The conformity that mono-culturalism imposes does not really respect the liberal value of freedom of choice and autonomy. Cultural pluralism manages to offer such different contexts from which individuals choose their cultural values freely. Cultural membership in one's culture is crucial to the exercise of freedom. Commenting on the cultural membership in specific cultural communities, Sarah Song wrote that "It is not simply membership in any culture, but one's *own culture* that must be secured in order for cultural membership to serve as a meaningful context of choice and a basis of self-respect" (emphasis in the original, 2017). This means that cultural diversity is vital to the individual's sense of identity and important to his/her social success. Cultural membership in a positively represented and recognized culture is important in peoples' self-identities. To complement his theory, Will Kymlicka argued that those who belong to a disadvantaged culture have the right to enjoy special protections in response to the requirements of the liberal egalitarian claims. Building his arguments within the liberal paradigm of egalitarianism, Kymlicka suggested that members of a marginalized cultural community need special consideration and accommodation from the cultural majority to put the principle of egalitarianism in practice. The liberal theory of equality or what has been generally referred to as "Luck Egalitarianism" (Anderson, 1999) states that individuals are responsible for the unequal results of their own choices, but they are not to blame if such inequality is generated by processes and circumstances outside their own reach and responsibilities. Such "imposed inequalities "are necessarily the responsibilities of the whole community. It is a collective responsibility that has to be assumed by all members or citizens of the society in question. Consequently, "unchosen" and "imposed" disadvantages have to compensate for by all the communities to establish the principle of equality, so fundamental of liberal societies and liberal theory. What Will Kymlicka did was to add disadvantaged cultural membership to this list of "unchosen" and "imposed" inequalities and hence national and ethnic minorities are rightfully entitled to collective recognition and accommodation of their own specificities. Thus, those born in majority culture will benefit naturally from the brute luck unlike those born in a marginalized minority culture whose chances of success and access to resources are limited due to the bad brute luck. Multicultural citizenship, that Will Kymlicka argues for is a liberal conception of cultural difference that sustains an institutional recognition and accommodation of the needs of marginalized cultural communities. It seeks to "emphasize the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities" (Kymlicka 1995, 109) so that the founding value of equality is put into effect.

However, as I suggested before, the Canadian experience looms large in the multicultural thought developed by Kymlicka. Will Kymlicka distinguishes between two sets of minority rights: cultural and national. He and other liberal multiculturalists believe that there should be two types of rights allocated to two different groups: national groups and cultural groups. Thus indigenous peoples were given rights such as self-determination since they were obliged to be a part of the established nation-state. That was not their choice but rather a historical political artifact. Yet, cultural minorities, who were mostly immigrant populations, had to a considerable extent a choice in leaving their culture of origin and thus they were given rights that offer fairer terms of integration into the host community.

Though Kymlicka's theory of Multicultural Citizenship was primarily concerned with the Canadian case study as I argued above, it has many affinities to the British context. After all, Britain is a multicultural society and a multinational political union as well (the Irish Question). In Britain, multiculturalism was represented as the most viable option during the 1980s and 19990s. To concretize the new multicultural agenda, Education was the major framework where multicultural values were to take place and flourish. One fundamental political document was the *Swann Report*. The *Swann Report* (1985) was a crucial step to encourage multicultural visions and practices in education. The report was entitled "Education for All" which suggested that none would be excluded from educational opportunities within the new multicultural settlement. The report was also called *The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups*. According to the discourses of the report, all ethnic minorities should enjoy the benefits of education and their cultures be recognized and appreciated. The report suggested a more inclusive multicultural education for both ethnic minorities and mainstream white majority. Such arguments were the substitute for the already assimilation-oriented approach of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Moreover, the report investigated ethnic

disadvantage in education and presented a wider analysis of the academic underachievement of ethnic minorities. The report suggested that institutional racism contributed to the failure of ethnic minorities' students. Equally, it rejected the provision of English as a second language and suggested that bilingual children should be educated through the mainstream educational system. So, the English language was considered as essential to successful educational experiences. This would improve students' intercultural understanding by being aware of minority cultures. The educational spaces become spaces for intercultural mixing and a hybrid place where students from all ethnic minorities can communicate and learn from each other. Accordingly, the *Swann Report* rejected segregated ethnic minority schools, especially Islamic schools which were regarded as a threat not only to social cohesion but also to the success and destiny of ethnic minorities themselves. Arguably, the report was an embodiment of the secular, inclusive multiculturalism away from the divisive exclusive character of religiously-based education.

The cultural pluralism that the report suggests, is a utopian vision of multiculturalism. It seems that such a vision needed a more practical and political endorsement to guarantee its realization and succeeds. This was not, unfortunately, the case since the report was largely overlooked by the British authorities. In general, the report presents a theoretical formula which both political orientations from the right and the left widely accepted but seldom realized when in office. The report states that:

> *I consider that a multi-racial society such as ours would in fact function most effectively and harmoniously on the basis of pluralism which enables, expects and encourages members of all ethnic groups, both minority and majority, to participate fully in shaping the society as a whole within a framework of commonly accepted values, practices and procedures, whilst also allowing and where necessary, assisting the ethnic minority communities in maintaining their distinct ethnic identities within this common framework*. (Hall, 2002: 59)

The *Swann Report* was consequently deemed as a moment of articulation of the need for cultural recognition of ethnic minorities and accommodating their rights. It was equally an official avowal that the time of cultural pluralism and then multiculturalism has gained momentum. Working with the postmodernist paradigm of the fractured and multiple cultural identities, many cultural critics agreed that the binary division between the categories of black and white was not tenable and credible. Those two binary mutually exclusive categories did not capture the dynamism and ever-changing character of identity, whether individual or collective. The postcolonial concept of "hybridity" (as presented by Homi Bhabha) well expresses the overlapping, constructed and multiple natures of identity formation and expression. Moreover, the increasing number of ethnicity-related studies confirms the fact that ethnic minorities themselves are not homogeneous blocks as they were used to be understood and represented by mainstream media and academia (Back and Solomos, 2000).

Another monumental report was produced the British race-related independent Runnymede Trust about the meaning of multiculturalism at the onset of the twenty-first century. The report was named "*The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*" and published in 2000. The report, also known as the *Parekh Report*, investigated the possible avenues and contours that race relations may take in what came to be considered as a British multicultural society. Being written under the chairmanship of Bikhu Parekh, the report proved an immediate success and enjoyed widespread popularity. According to the British cultural critic Andrew Pilkington "The purpose of the report was to analyze the current state of Britain and propose ways of combating racial disadvantage and enabling Britain become a vibrant multicultural society (2003: p 265).

The report conducted large qualitative researches based on a number of interviews and observational corpus. The report asked for a revision of the British national story so that to include the various cultural narratives which constitute the British community. It stressed the multiple nature of cultural identity which cannot be based on a single fossilized conception of culture or identity. Bikhu Parekh acknowledges the inevitable and salient tensions between the value systems of the majority and those of minority communities. He argues that any political society

> *Should foster a strong sense of unity and common belonging among its citizens, as otherwise, it cannot act as a united community able to take and enforce collectively-binding decisions and regulate and resolve conflicts*. (2000b, p. 196)

However, despite dangers that a multicultural community like Britain may face, there is a genuine chance that different ethnic groups can create a sound and balanced multicultural community, providing that they respect the different cultural traditions that make up the contemporary British society. Parekh believes that British is better to be conceived as a "community of communities" and also a "community of citizens". The *Parekh Report* suggested a number of proposals and recommendation that would facilitate the creation of a successful multicultural society in Britain. Those recommendations can be summarized as follows:

-The need to rethink the national story and national identity;

-The need to recognize that Britain comprises a range of "majority" and "minority" communities which are internally diverse and which are changing;

-The need to strike a balance between the need to treat people equally, the need to respect differences and the need to maintain shared values and social cohesion;

-The need to address and remove all forms of racism;

- The need to reduce economic inequalities;

-The need to build a pluralist human rights culture. (Pilkington, 2003: pp 265-266)

The report received different attitudes. Yet, it has been considered as a fundamental high profile document that elaborated and examined the idea of multiculturalism and pluralist models in contemporary Britain. The Swann Report and the Parekh Report, though crucial in shaping British multicultural profile, were not unique in doing so. There have been a number of other fundamental reports and legal documents which contributed to the multicultural nature of Britain such as The Race Relations Amendment Act (2000) and *Children's Plan: Building Brighter Futures* (2007).

However, the multicultural pluralist model was also criticized by many political and cultural theorists because of a number of shortcomings that seemed to suffer from. I briefly state some of those critiques and their political, theoretical and ideological underpinnings. Those critiques of the pluralist model can be roughly classified into three different perspectives: cosmopolitan critique, postcolonial critique and feminist critique. Those different critiques employed different angles of views in their broaching of the issue of multiculturalism.

The cosmopolitan critique believes that the politics of multiculturalism seem to be based on an essentialist conception of culture. So, multiculturalism considers cultures as self-contained systems that coexist and communicate with each other within a framework of pluralism. The cosmopolitan critique argues that culture is best understood as the product of hybrid interactions between the various elements of culture. Thus no culture is pure and immune from acculturation, transculturation, and cross-culturation. The social agents can generate their meaningful options from a variety of cultures not just from one specific culture. Cultures are interrelated, overlapping and interacting. The New Zealander philosopher Jeremy Waldron argues that

> *We live in a world formed by technology and trade; by economic, religious, and political imperialism and their offspring; by mass migration and the dispersion of cultural influences. In this context, to immerse oneself in the traditional practices of, say, an aboriginal culture might be a fascinating anthropological experiment, but it involves an artificial dislocation from what actually is going on in the world* (1995, 100).

The cosmopolitan global character of contemporary global societies, aided by the widespread of technology and information boom, renders any pure or authentic culture a myth.

The postcolonial critique focuses on the role of multiculturalism and the resultant politics of recognition in reproducing the traditional structures of colonial and imperial domination of the state on its indigenous communities. Thus to use Glen Coulthard (2014) arguments, multiculturalism could be considered as a variant of liberalism, which was in many respects the driving force behind the emergence and sustaining of colonialism. Coulthard argues that the real self-determination and recognition of the ethnic minorities and national communities are generated by self-affirmation not being recognized or tolerated by the colonizer. Self-actualization and direct action are essential in that project of self-emancipation. In this context, multiculturalism is regarded as a strategy of containment and

fragmentation of a united ethnic resistance of the hegemonic colonial and imperial structures of power and domination.

Finally, the feminist critique is deemed as one of the most influential critiques of multiculturalism. The major thesis of the feminist critique is that the cultural, social, political, and legal protections and accommodations granted to minority groups may generate internal, in-group oppressions and inequalities. The victims of such intragroup domination and oppression are those most vulnerable communities among whom are women. This problem was widely referred to as the problem of "internal minorities" or "minorities within minority" (Green 1994, Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2005). The idea of subgroups within the minority group (religious dissidents, generation gap, feminist movements, and sexual groups) was a major problem for feminist critics. Multicultural theorists tended to concentrate on inter-group inequality while relating intragroup ones to a marginal invisible position. The special protections and accommodations offered by the theory of multicultural citizenship tend to empower ethnic minorities' community leaders who capitalize on internal conformity and consensus in order to compete for the allocated resources. In the process, any potential dissent is stifled within the community to secure the highest degrees of internal cultural and social cohesion. Feminists argue that women, especially in conservative religious communities, bear the burden of what I can call the institutional encouragement of the intragroup status quo. This status quo would hamper any possibilities or potentials of group progress. Issues of patriarchy and arranged marriages within Muslim communities in Britain can be a clear example of how community leaders intervene in autonomy and individualism of their community members. This very feminist critique sheds the light on the possible contradictions within multicultural liberal societies where liberal values such as autonomy, justice, and equality are respected within the public mainstream society while being violated in the name of same multicultural liberalism within the various ethnic minority groups.

Now I move to investigate the last model of integrating ethnic minorities within the multicultural and multiethnic community that is the Millet Model.

6. THE MILLET MODEL

In general, the Millet Model is a system of religious and cultural classification. It is based on a deep belief that human beings need to belong to specific cultural communities given that humans are culturally embedded. This model essentializes cultures and seems to create rigid boundaries between the various cultural religious and ethnic communities. The Millet Model divides society into isolated cultural communities and institutionalizes their respective differences. This act of social and political arrangements promotes a form of consociation in which constitutive groups coexist with each other without genuine and effective communication and without developing a shared collective community or identity. The Millet Model was a perfect integrationist system followed by imperial regimes. The concept originated within the Muslim Ottoman Empire, which was a large empire composed of a great diversity of ethnic, national, cultural and religious communities. The Millet Model was successful in that it sustained such great diversity within legal and political communities. However, as I mentioned before, its major defects were its inability to create a common cultural identity and its hampering of the natural progressive communication between the different "millets" of the empire. Within the Ottoman context, the Millet system managed to record considerable degrees of cultural and religious toleration. Nevertheless, it failed in creating vibrant, dynamic constitutive communities. Bikhu Parekh contended that the Millet Model "froze religious communities, rigidified their internal structures, and arrested the growth of common bonds and a shared political life" (1998: 11). However, the Millet Model seems inappropriate within a highly industrialized complex society like contemporary Britain; though there are sometimes some socio-cultural arrangements which simulate the requirements of the Millet Model such as community leaders and the control of their respective communities. Concentrated or segregated ethnic communities may develop into self-contained cultural blocks that hamper any authentic collective culture and identity in which community elites and leaders may transform such closed communities into millets.

Being based on the socio-political technique of Pillarisation, where society is divided and fragmented vertically into different segments or pillars with no direct political f cultural contact, the Millet Model can, I believe, find its modern expression in the theory of consociationalism. The political theory of consociationalism seems to express the Millet Model practices and ideology in its barest sense.

Consociationalism is a political normative theory that tries to broach the issue of social cohesion and political cooperation within deeply culturally, nationally and ethnically divided societies. The theory was developed by the political scientist Arend Lijphart. Terminologically, the term Consociationalism is derived from the root word "consociation" which is composed of two items: the prefix "con-"and the word "sociation". Lexically, the concept "consociation" means the coexistence of different societies each of which is separate from the other, but they exist side by side and have specific relations and political arrangements. Hence, consociational democracy is, according to Lijphart, a combination of "autonomy" and "power sharing" within deeply fragmented and segmented societies. He wrote that there was an agreement

> *that the successful establishment of a democratic government in divided societies requires two key elements: power sharing and group autonomy. Power sharing denotes the participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political decision making, especially at the executive level; group autonomy means that these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture*. (2004: 96-109)

However, it is in the "power sharing" aspect, that the Millet Model differs from the consociational democracy. Based on Millet system's history, there was no true power sharing, at least in the modern sense of the concept, between the central dominant elite and other constitutive communities. Political power is thus centralized. In the consociational settlement, power is politically shared via negotiations between the various elites of the constitutive consociational society.

The lack of a certain socio-cultural homogeneity is deemed as a grave problem for the process of democratization. However, what antagonistic social and cultural groups need to share in a consociational democracy is a respect of the rules of the democratic game in the proceduralist style of governance that I discussed above. So, each group "interacts" with other groups through elected representatives who are supposed to be competent and qualified members of those segmented communities within what is called the elitist approach of political interaction. Arguably, within the British context, what is generally referred to as "ethnic community leaders", can be considered as an example of consociational arrangements. The local authorities in Britain tend to negotiate with those leaders whenever an ethnicity-related issue is under consideration. For instance, the "race riots" of 2001 or the London Bombings of 2005 were an opportunity which local authorities seized to negotiate with Muslim community leaders certain arrangements for violence appeasement and treatment. Such practices, validate Lijphart's claim that what he and other consociational theorists did was simply to academically study what politicians had already invented many decades before the official appearance of the theory power-sharing democracy or consociationalism.

Consociationalism does not require social or cultural homogeneity. It is not meant to create cultural and social conformity. Difference-in all its variants- is respected but it is confined to specific pillars. Consequently, no cultural or social group is to impose its world view and ways of life on others. There is no hegemonic culture. There is nothing called the influence of the dominant culture in the political sharing of power. The theory is essentially meant to deal with a society in which no or few memberships cut across socio-cultural and ethnic cleavages. In consociational society power, is shared cooperatively between the different segments of the society in question. For the theory to work effectively, Lijphart suggested that consociational democracies are characterized by four major features: grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto. Without detailing those features, it is sufficient to show how they are related, and above all how they contribute to the ethnocultural conflict management. And thus, they result in social cohesion. Being divided into different socio-cultural segments, consociational society respects such segments and allows for cooperation between their representatives: the elites. Each segment or pillar is proportionally represented in the governing oligarchy which prevents a situation of majoritarian dominance and tyranny. There is a virtual balance created by a constant system of checks. A mutual veto creates a balance of interests and guarantees each pillar's security. Consociational democracy is thus built upon cooperation, consensus, and collaboration rather than competition. Social cohesion is thus the outcome of cooperation and collaboration between the different representative elites. It is also achieved by discouraging mass interaction and permitting minorities to make their own decisions for their communities; a case of leading "parallel lives" It seems that consociationalism breeds a sense of segmental self-determination and propels a strategy of

avoidance between ethnically and culturally divergent communities. However, it is crucial to emphasize that consociationalism, like other theories of democracy, is a solution to specific context-governed problems. It is an option taken within severely different and fragmented societies to manage conflict and secure a satisfactory level of social cohesion.

7. CONCLUSION

To conclude, this article examined critically the various possible models, philosophies, and approaches of integrating ethnic minorities available to virtually any multi-ethnic and multicultural society. Also, multinationalism is taken into account in those integration models. It is necessary to state that, those different models can in many respects and in different temporal and spatial contexts overlap and intersect. They are complementing each other and responding to the specific needs of specific communities at specific moments of their social, political and cultural histories. For instance, Britain witnessed the trial of some of those models like assimilationism and multiculturalism in different historical epochs in response to certain ideological and political needs.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abercrombie, Nicholas, Warde, Alan, Soothill, Keith, Urry, John and Walby, Sylvia. *Contemporary British Society*. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994.

Allen, Christopher, and Nielsen, Jorgen. "Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001". Vienna: European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2004.

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991.

Anderson, Elizabeth. "What is the Point of Equality?"*Ethics*, 109(2): 287–337, 1999.

Back Les, Solomos, John. *Theories of Race and Racism: A Reader*. London, Routledge, 2000.

Berger, Peter. *The Social Reality of Religion*. London, Faber and Faber, 1968.

Bhabha, Homi. *Nation and Narration*. London, Routledge, 1990.

Blaisdell, Bob. *Infamous Speeches: From Robespierre to Osama bin Laden*. New York, Dover Publications, 2011.

Carvel, John. « Tebbit's cricket loyalty test hit for six", *The Guardian*, 09 January 2004. (https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/jan/08/britishidentity.race), accessed on 18 May 2016.

Castles, Stephen. ""How nation-states respond to immigration and ethnic diversity", *New Community*, vol. 21, n3, (1995)

Cesari, Jocelyne. "Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority" in Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck. Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2002.

Coulthard, Glen. *Red Skins, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2014.

Eisenberg, Avigail and Spinner-Halev, Jeff (Eds.). *Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights, and Diversity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Farmer, Brian. *Radical Islam in the West: Ideology and Challenge*. London : McFarland, 2011.

Favell, Andrew. *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Green, Leslie. "Internal Minorities and Their Rights," in *Group Rights*, J. Baker (Ed.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 101–117, 1994.

Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson. *Why Deliberative Democracy*? New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck and Golson, Tyler. "Overhauling Islam: Representation, Construction, and Cooption of "Moderate Islam" in Western Europe", Journal of Church and State, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 487-515, Summer 2007.

Hall, Kathleen D. *Lives in Translation: Sikh Youth as British Citizens*. Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.

Hendrikson, Hollie. "Summary of *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*", Conflict Research Consortium

(https://www.beyondintractability.org/bksum/huntington-clash), accessed on 12 May 2016.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

Jeffries , Stuart. « 'Swamped' and 'riddled': the toxic words that wreck public discourse", *The Guardian*, 27 October 2014.

(https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/27/swamped-and-riddled-toxic-phrases-wreck-politics-immigration-michael-fallon), accessed on 12 March 2016.

Kymlicka, Will. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Lijphart, Arend. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977.

Laurence, Jonathan. "From an Elysée Salon to the Table of the Republic: State-Islam Relations and the Integration of Muslims in France", *in Yearbook on Minority Issues: The Impact of Migration and Cultural Diversity on Domestic Law and Politics*. Kluwer Law International, 2005.

Lijphart, Arend. "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies", *Journal of Democracy,* Volume 15, Number 2, pp 96-109, 2004.

McQueen, Paddy. "Social and political recognition", *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (http://www.iep.utm.edu/recog_sp/), accessed on 15 August 2017.

Miles, Robert and Brown, Malcolm. *Racism*. London, Routledge, 1989.

Nielsen, Jorgen. "Religion, Muslims and the State in Britain and France: From Westphalia to 9/11", paper presented in the Indiana University Conference entitled "Muslims, and Arabs in Western Politics", 2005.

Nökel, Sigrid and Tezcan, Levent, Eds. *Islam and the New Europe – Continuities, Changes, Confrontations*. Bielefeld: Transcript. *Yearbook of the sociology of Islam*. 6, 2005.

Parekh, Bhikhu. "Integrating Minorities" in Blackstone, Tessa., Parekh, Bhikhu, and Sanders, Peter., *Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Parekh, Bhikhu. *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: Report of the Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain*. London: Profile Books in association with Runnymede Trust, 2000a.

Parekh, Bhikhu. *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2000b.

Pargeter, Alison . *New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe.* Pennsylvania : University of Pennsylvania , 2013.

Pérez, Soledad Analía. « Epistemic Proceduralism, Capabilities and Rights: An Approach from the Perspective of Amartya Sen", Sociology and Anthropology 5(6): 450-457, 2017.

Pilkington, Andrew. *Racial Disadvantage and Ethnic Diversity in Britain*. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2003.

Power, Carla. "New Imams", *Newsweek*, 17 January, 2005.

Rawls, John. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

Renan, Ernest. « What is Nation ? », translated by Martin Thom in Bhabha, Homi. *Nation and Narration*. London, Routledge, 1990.

Richardson, John and Lambert, John. *The Sociology of Race*. Ormskirk, Causeway Press, 1985.

Roggero, Maria Adele. “Muslims in Italy”, in *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens*, ed. Yvonne Hadda, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Saggar, Shamit. *Race and Politics in Britain.* New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.

Seidel, G. “Culture, nation and “race” in the British and French New Right”, in Levitas, Ruth (Ed.) *The Ideology of the New Right*. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1986.

Sen, Amartya. *Development as Freedom*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1999.

Song, Sarah, "Multiculturalism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zeta (Ed.), (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/multiculturalism/), accessed on 20 September 2017.

Taylor, Charles. “The Politics of Recognition” in -Gutmann, Amy. *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1994.

Waldron, Jeremy. “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative” in *The Rights of Minority Cultures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Wenar, Leif, "John Rawls", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls/>. Accessed on 20 May 2017.